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Kenneth Arrow’s work on social welfare proposed a set of conditions that a function to aggregate ordinalpreferences of the members of a group should satisfy, proving that it was not possible to satisfy all these
assumptions simultaneously. Later, Ralph Keeney adapted these conditions and proposed a cardinal utility
axiomatization for the problem of aggregating the utility functions. This note discusses in particular the condi-
tion of nondictatorship. It proposes stronger formulations for this condition to limit the maximum influence that
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functions. An extension to address coalitions of individuals acting strategically is also discussed.
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1. Introduction
Decision analysis is often called for to support deci-
sions made by a group (e.g., a society, a committee,
or a team). This can be accomplished by aggregat-
ing the utilities of the individuals by a group util-
ity function, or by using other means of aggregating
the results of an individual decision analysis, or by
fostering discussion of these individual analyses, as
discussed by Bose et al. (1997), not to mention the
cases where decision analysis is not used at all (Schein
1999, pp. 158–164). A review by Keefer et al. (2004)
mentions 12 decision analysis articles in the period
1990–2001 addressing group decision or the combi-
nation of expert opinions. For a recent review of the
field of group decision in general, we refer the reader
to Kilgour and Eden (2010).
This work focuses on the possibility of build-
ing a group utility function from individual utility
functions, rather than situations where a group gets
together to conjointly build a model reaching a con-
sensus (for examples of the latter, see Phillips and
Bana e Costa 2007, Merrick et al. 2005). There are sev-
eral proposals of axioms for characterizing a group
utility function. As examples we can cite Harsanyi
(1955), Keeney and Kirkwood (1975), and Baucells
and Sarin (2003) for the case of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947) utilities, or Dyer and Sarin (1979)
and Harvey (1999) for the case of utilities based on
strength of preference. We focus here in particular on
Keeney’s (1976) group cardinal utility axiomatization,
which translates to utility theory the conditions put
forward by Arrow (1951) for aggregating individual
rankings into a social ranking.
The contribution of this work is to revisit and
reinterpret the condition of nondictatorship put for-
ward by Arrow (1951) in a way that makes it
more consistent with common understanding of what
a dictator is. Stronger conditions that limit the
maximum influence that any single individual can
have are proposed, considering the purpose of the
group’s decision: either obtaining a full ranking of
the alternatives or just selecting a winner. Then,
the corresponding new characterizations of group
utility functions over certain alternatives and group
expected utility functions over uncertain alternatives
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functions over uncertain alternatives, these character-
izations place an upper bound on each individual’s
weight. An extension of the notion of dictator to coali-
tions of individuals is also discussed.
2. The Results of Arrow (1951) and
Keeney (1976)
Arrow (1951) addressed the problem of aggregating
N individual rankings into a group ranking. Formally,
Arrow considered at the outset binary relations Ri
such that for any two alternatives a and b, a Ri b
means that the individual indexed by i 4i = 11 0 0 0 1N 5
either prefers a to b or is indifferent between them.
Arrow defined that these binary relations should be
weak orders through two axioms stating that Ri is
connected and transitive. The desideratum for an
aggregation method, according to Arrow, would be to
obtain a social ranking R that is also connected and
transitive. This method should satisfy five seemingly
reasonable conditions: universality, positive associa-
tion of social and individual values, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, citizens’ sovereignty, and
nondictatorship.
Keeney (1976) formulated a group cardinal utility
axiomatization for certain and for uncertain alterna-
tives. Formally, Keeney considered at the outset a set
of N cardinal utilities ui4aj5 concerning individuals
indexed by i 4i = 11 0 0 0 1N 5 and alternatives indexed
by j 4j = 11 0 0 0 1M5, and proposed five assumptions
parallel to Arrow’s conditions that a group cardinal
utility function uG = u4u11 0 0 0 1uN 5 should be consis-
tent with (Keeney 1976, p. 142):
Assumption B1. There are at least two individual members
in the group, at least two alternatives, and group utilities
are specified for all possible individual member’s utilities.
Assumption B2. If the group utilities indicate alternative
a is preferred to alternative b for a certain set of individual
utilities, then the group utilities must imply a is preferred
to b if (i) the individual’s utilities of alternatives other than
a are not changed and (ii) each individual’s utilities for a
either remain unchanged or are increased.
Assumption B3. If an alternative is eliminated from
consideration, the new group utilities for the remain-
ing alternatives should be equivalent (i.e., positive linear
transformations) of the original group utilities for these same
alternatives.
Assumption B4. For each pair of alternatives a and b, there
is some set of individual utilities such that the group prefers
a to b.
Assumption B5. There is no individual with the property
that whenever he prefers alternative a to b, the group will
also prefer a to b regardless of the other individuals’ utilities.
Two main results were proved. In the case of certain
alternatives, uG is consistent with those five assump-
tions if and only if du/dui ≥ 0, for i = 11 0 0 0 1N ,
and the inequality is strict for at least two ui’s
(Keeney 1976, Theorem 1). In the case of uncertain
alternatives (involving aggregation of von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utilities), to be consistent with
the five assumptions, uG needs to be a linear combina-
tion of individual expected utility functions (Keeney
1976, Theorem 2):




with ki ≥ 0, for i= 11 0 0 0 1N , and the inequality is strict
for at least two ki’s. The ki’s are scaling coefficients
associated with the individuals.
3. Strengthening the Nondictatorship
Assumption
Arrow’s (1951, p. 30) nondictatorship condition states
that “[t]he social welfare function is not to be dicta-
torial,” where dictatorial means that “there exists an
individual i such that, for all a and b, a Pi b implies
a P b regardless of the orderings R11 0 0 0 1RN of all
individuals other than i, where P is the social pref-
erence relation corresponding to R11 0 0 0 1RN .” Let us
note that according to this definition, if individual i is
a dictator, then R=Ri.
Keeney (1976) formulated by analogy a nondic-
tatorship condition (Assumption B5 in the previous
section). As in Arrow’s (1951) case, this assumption
implies that if individual i is a dictator, then the group
ranking provided by uG coincides with the ranking
implicit in ui.
The nondictatorship conditions of Arrow and
Keeney consider that a dictator is an individual so
powerful that for any conceivable pair (a1 b5 in the
space of alternatives (not necessarily the actual alter-


































































































Dias and Sarabando: A Note on a Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility
Decision Analysis 9(3), pp. 231–237, © 2012 INFORMS 233
Table 1 Hypothetical Utilities of N Individuals
Individual 1 Individual 2 · · · Individual N
ui 4a5 u14a5 0 0
ui 4b5 u14b5 1 · · · 1
ki 1−  k2 kN
if the dictator (an individual i5 deems that a is pre-
ferred to b, then this yields a P b for the group, no
matter how close ui4a5 and ui4b5 are.
Consider for instance that uG follows the additive
model (1), irrespective of addressing certain or uncer-
tain alternatives. Let us also assume that (following
a common convention) all utilities are in the 60117
interval, and the sum of the scaling coefficients is
equal to 1:




Let us consider an example in which an individual
(i = 1) has a scaling coefficient arbitrarily close to 1:
k1 = 1 −  for a small positive quantity . In the situ-
ation depicted in Table 1, individual 1 is not a dicta-
tor in Keeney’s (1976) sense. Indeed, no matter how
small  is, we can conceive of two alternatives such
that uG4b5 > uG4a5, despite u14b5 < u14a5. For instance,
if u14a5 = c and u14b5 = c − , then uG4b5 − uG4a5 =
41 − 54c− 5+ − 41 − 5c = 2 > 0.
Suppose that there are three individuals and k1 =
009990, k2 = 000005, and k3 = 000005. In this situation,
individuals 2 and 3 would arguably consider that
individual 1 is a dictator. One might counterargue,
claiming that individual 1 is not a dictator because,
for instance, if individual 1 had a very slight pref-
erence for one alternative a compared to some other
alternative b, then individuals 2 and 3 might be deci-
sive if they have an extreme preference for b (namely,
have utility 1 for b and utility 0 for a5. However,
this explanation would hardly convince individuals 2
and 3 that there is no dictatorship.
A reasoning that can lead to the sentiment that
these scaling coefficients would make individual 1
a dictator is that it is very easy for individual 1 to
impose a winner, or even a whole ranking, regardless
of the utilities of all other individuals. For instance, if
there are five alternatives a, b, c, d, and e, and indi-
vidual 1 declares, for instance, u14a5= 1, u14b5= 0075,
u14c5= 005, u14d5= 0025, and u14e5= 0, then he would
impose the ranking a P b P c P d P e even if this totally
contradicts the utilities of individuals 2 and 3.
This type of reasoning involves acknowledging the
possibility of strategic misrepresentation, but in a way
that makes it more difficult to accept socially than
what is usually considered in voting theory. In vot-
ing theory a method is said to be subject to strate-
gic vote (subject to “manipulation”) if an individual
might get some benefit by not voting according to his
preferences. For instance, an individual can vote for
his second choice because he foresees that a worse
candidate might win if he votes for his first choice.
This is not considered a major drawback because, as
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown,
all universal and nondictatorial methods that aggre-
gate individual rankings to produce a social ranking
are potentially subject to strategic vote. Furthermore,
the fact that an individual might benefit does not
guarantee he will benefit: this would require knowing
the preferences of the other individuals in advance,
and knowing whether these other individuals would
also vote strategically.
The type of strategic misrepresentation that we can
seek to prevent is arguably much more crucial to the
acceptability of a group aggregation model: no indi-
vidual should be able to indicate his (possibly mis-
represented) preferences in a way that it guarantees
that his preferences are reproduced by the group util-
ity function regardless of the preferences indicated
by all other members. This can be formalized in
different ways. We next propose three conditions a
group might wish to enforce to avoid such a “strategic
dictator.”
Condition 1 (Immunity to Imposition of a Rank-
ing by an Individual (IIR)). There is no individual
with the property that he can indicate preferences
(possibly acting strategically) in a way that guarantees
that the group’s ranking of the alternatives coincides
with his complete ranking of the alternatives (without
ties), regardless of all other individuals’ preferences.
Condition 2 (Immunity to Imposition of a Win-
ner by an Individual (IIW)). There is no individual
with the property that he can indicate preferences in a
way that guarantees that his preferred alternative has
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other alternatives, regardless of all other individuals’
preferences.
Condition 3 (Immunity to Imposition of a Weak
Winner by an Individual (IIWW)). There is no indi-
vidual with the property that he can indicate prefer-
ences in a way that guarantees his preferred alternative
has the highest group utility, possibly indifferent to
other alternatives (i.e., other alternatives can be tied
for the first place), regardless of all other individuals’
preferences.
Note that IIWW implies IIW, which in turn implies
IIR, and IIR implies the nondictatorship conditions of
Arrow (1951) and Keeney (1976).
4. Axiomatization
Although Conditions 1–3 could also be set in Arrow’s
(1951) context of ordinal aggregation, we focus on the
group cardinal utility setting of Keeney (1976).
Let us recall that we are considering 0, the worst
possible utility level, and 1, the best possible util-
ity level (which is a commonly used scale). Normal-
izing utility functions (e.g., by means of an affine
transformation) so that all utilities are in the inter-
val [0, 1] can make these functions dependent on the
set of actual alternatives or the set of potential alter-
natives the group should agree to consider. Dhillon
and Mertens (1999) suggest that such normalization
should take into account the set of all potential alter-
natives limited only by feasibility and justice. The
propositions that follow do not depend on how the
60117 normalization is made. Furthermore, because
we are admitting the possibility of strategically mis-
representing preferences, assuming a 60117 interval
for utilities merely bounds the utilities that each indi-
vidual can indicate (rather than have).
Let uG4ui10−i5 denote the group utility of an alter-
native that has utility ui for individual i and utility
0 for all other individuals. Let uG4ui11−i5 denote the
group utility of an alternative that has utility ui for
individual i and utility 1 for all other individuals.
The following propositions characterize a group util-
ity function that satisfies Keeney’s (1976) assumptions
plus immunity to a strategic dictator.
Proposition 1. A group cardinal utility function over
certain alternatives with utilities in 60117 is consis-
tent with Assumptions B1–B4 and IIW if and only if
du/dui ≥ 0, for i = 11 0 0 0 1N , with strict inequality for
at least two ui’s, and there is no individual i such that
uG41i10−i5 > uG40i11−i5.
Proof. 4⇐5 Assume there is no individual i such
that uG41i10−i5 > uG40i11−i5. Then, if N − 1 individ-
uals assign utility 0 to an alternative a and utility
1 to an alternative b, the remaining individuals can-
not impose a as a (single) winner. Thus, IIW (which
refers to the possibility of imposing any alternative
as a single winner) is assured. Keeney’s (1976) The-
orem 1 proves that du/dui ≥ 0, for i = 11 0 0 0 1N , with
strict inequality for at least two ui’s, is sufficient for
Assumptions B1–B4.
4⇒5 Assume by contradiction that uG41i10−i5 >
uG40i11−i5 for some individual i. If i’s preferred alter-
native is a and he states ui4a5 = 1, and for all b 6= a
states ui4b5 = 0, then uG4a5 > uG4b5, imposing a as
a winner, even if all other individuals j 6= i state
uj4a5= 0 and for all b 6= a state uj4b5 = 1. Keeney’s
(1976) Theorem 1 proves the necessity of Assump-
tions B1–B4. 
Proposition 2. A group cardinal utility function over
certain alternatives with utilities in 60117 is consistent
with Assumptions B1–B4 and IIWW if and only if
du/dui ≥ 0, for i = 11 0 0 0 1N , with strict inequality for
at least two ui’s and there is no individual i such that
uG41i10−i5≥ uG40i11−i5.
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. A group cardinal expected utility
function over uncertain alternatives with utilities in 60117
is consistent with Assumptions B1–B4 and IIW if and only
if it has the form (1) and ki ≥ 0, for i= 11 0 0 0 1N , and there
is no individual i such that ki > 005.
Proof. This is a corollary of Proposition 1 apply-
ing (1) together with Keeney’s (1976) Theorem 2. Note
that when ki > 005, Equation (1) yields uG41i10−i5 >
005, and, because k1 + · · · + ki−1 + ki+1 + · · · + kN =
1 − ki (recall we assume weights add up to one), Equa-
tion (1) yields uG40i11−i5 < 005. 
Proposition 4. A group cardinal expected utility
function over uncertain alternatives with utilities in 60117
is consistent with Assumptions B1–B4 and IIWW if and
only if it has the form (1) and ki ≥ 0, for i= 11 0 0 0 1N , and


































































































Dias and Sarabando: A Note on a Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility
Decision Analysis 9(3), pp. 231–237, © 2012 INFORMS 235
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.
When we consider the IIR condition (immunity to
imposition of a ranking by an individual) for group
expected utility functions over uncertain alternatives,
we can also find a characterization that is easy to
verify in practice (Proposition 6 below). However, for
the case of utilities over certain alternatives, the char-
acterization we obtain (Proposition 5 below) is less
prone to be easily checked. Let us first introduce some
additional notation:
Let M denote the number of alternatives to be
ranked.
Let Si415 = 8di ∈ 601172 uG4di10−i5 > uG4011−i59.
If Si415 6= , let di415 = inf Si415. Then, individual i is
able to impose a preference between two of the alter-
natives a617 and a627 by assigning ui4a6175 = di415 and
ui4a6275= 0, regardless of the other individuals’ prefer-
ences. Let us now define recursively
Si4j+15 =

 if Si4j5 = 1
8di ∈ 6di4j51172
uG4di10−i5 > uG4di4j511−i59 if Si4j5 6= 1
where di4j5 = inf Si4j5.
Thus, if Si425 6= , individual i is able to impose a
preference ranking between three of the alternatives
a617, a627, and a637 by assigning ui4a6175 = di425, ui4a6275 =
di415, and ui4a6375=0, regardless of the other individu-
als’ preferences, and so on. By recursion, if Si4j5 6= ,
individual i is able to impose a preference ranking for
j + 1 alternatives.
Proposition 5. A group cardinal utility function over
certain alternatives with utilities in 60117 is consis-
tent with Assumptions B1–B4 and IIR if and only if
du/dui ≥ 0, with strict inequality for at least two ui’s, and
Si4M−15 = , for i= 11 0 0 0 1N .
Proof. 4⇐) Assume Si4M−15 = , for i = 11 0 0 0 1N .
By construction, this means that no individual can
impose a ranking of the M alternatives. Thus IIR
(which refers to the possibility of imposing any
complete ranking) is assured. Keeney’s (1976) Theo-
rem 1 proves that du/dui ≥ 0, for i = 11 0 0 0 1N , with
strict inequality for at least two ui’s, is sufficient for
Assumptions B1–B4.
4⇒) Assume by contradiction that Si4M−15 6=  for
some individual i. By construction, if Si4M−15 6= ,
individual i is able to impose a ranking a617Pa627
P1 0 0 0 1 Pa6M7 by assigning ui4a6175 = di4M−15, ui4a6275 =
di4M−251 0 0 0 1ui4a6M75 = 0. Keeney’s (1976) Theorem 1
proves the necessity of Assumptions B1–B4. 
Proposition 6. A group cardinal expected utility
function over uncertain alternatives with utilities in 60117
is consistent with Assumptions B1–B4 and IIR if and only
if it has the form (1) and ki ≥ 0, for i= 11 0 0 0 1N , and there
is no individual i such that ki > 4M − 15/M .
Proof. This is a corollary of Proposition 5 apply-
ing (1) together with Keeney’s (1976) Theorem 2,
because uG4 + di4j510−i5 > uG4di4j511−i5 ⇔ ki > 4k1 +
· · · + ki−1 + ki+1 + · · · + kN 5, which does not depend
on di4j5. Therefore, di425 − di415 = di435 − di425, and so on.
Thus, Si4M−15 6=  if and only if ki/4M − 15 − 4k1 +
· · · + ki−1 + ki+1 + · · · + kN 5 > 0, allowing individual
i to impose a ranking a617Pa627P1 0 0 0 1 Pa6M7 by assign-
ing ui4a6175 = 4M − 15/4M − 15 = 1, ui4a6275 = 4M − 25/
4M − 151 0 0 0 1ui4a6M−175 = 1/4M − 15, and ui4a6M75 = 0.
Because weights add up to one, ki/4M−15−4k1 +· · ·+
ki−1 + ki+1 + · · · + kN 5 > 0 ⇔ ki/4M − 15− 41 − ki5 > 0 ⇔
ki > 4M − 15/M . 
Let us note that IIR refers to the imposition of a
complete order. The case of imposing a weak order
(where ties are allowed) is not interesting: to impose
that a group utility function faithfully reproduces a
weak order would imply that du/dui = 0 for all indi-
viduals except the dictator, thereby failing to comply
with Keeney’s (1976) definition of a cardinal group
utility function.
5. Extension to Coalitions of
Individuals Acting Strategically
The notions of imposition of a ranking and imposition
of a winner can be extended to a coalition of individ-
uals who strategically act as a group, according to the
following definitions:
Imposition of a winner by a coalition. A coalition of
individuals C ⊆ 811 0 0 0 1N 9 who have the same pre-
ferred winner (without indifference, i.e., without alter-
natives tied for the first place) can impose this winner
to the rest of the group (without indifference) if the
members of C can indicate preferences (possibly act-
ing strategically) in a way that guarantees that the pre-
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group utility, without indifference, regardless of all
other individuals’ preferences.
Imposition of a weak winner by a coalition. This is the
same as the previous definition, but allowing indiffer-
ence, i.e., allowing other alternatives to be tied for the
first place.
Imposition of a ranking (complete order) by a coalition.
A coalition of individuals C ⊆ 811 0 0 0 1N 9 who have
the same preferred ranking can impose this ranking
to the rest of the group if the members of C can indi-
cate preferences in a way that guarantees the (overall)
group’s ranking of the alternatives coincides with the
preferred ranking of the members of C, regardless of
all other individuals’ preferences.
For brevity we will focus on the notion of imposi-
tion of a winner and on the case of a group cardinal
expected utility function over uncertain alternatives.
The following results characterize expected utility
functions seeking to avoid a dictatorial coalition.
Proposition 7. Given the conditions of Proposition 3,
a coalition of individuals C ⊆ 811 0 0 0 1N 9 who have the
same preferred winner can impose this winner to the rest
of the group (let C¯ = 811 0 0 0 1N 9 − C) if and only if∑
i∈C ki > 005.
Proof. 4⇐) If ∑i∈C ki > 005 and individuals in C
assign utility 1 to an alternative a, then uG4a5 =∑
i∈C ki +
∑
i∈C¯ kiui4a5 > 005. If the same individuals
assign utility 0 to an alternative b, then uG4b5 =∑
i∈C¯ kiui4b5 ≤
∑
i∈C¯ ki < 005 (because
∑
i∈C¯ ki = 1 −∑
i∈C ki5. Hence, uG4a5 > uG4b5; i.e., individuals in C
are able to impose a as a winner.
4⇒) Assume by contradiction that ∑i∈C ki ≤ 005. If
individuals not in C assign utility 0 to an alternative
a, then uG4a5 ≤
∑
i∈C ki ≤ 005. If the same individuals
assign utility 1 to an alternative b, then uG4b5 ≥∑
i∈C¯ ki ≥ 1 − 005. In such a case, uG4a5 ≤ uG4b5; i.e.,
individuals in C are not able to impose a as a (single)
winner. 
Corollary of Proposition 7. Given the conditions
of Proposition 3, there is no coalition of Nc individuals
capable of imposing their preferred winner to the group if
ki ≤ 005/Nc for i= 11 0 0 0 1N .
Proof. If ki ≤ 005/Nc for all individuals and there
are Nc individuals in C, then
∑
i∈C ki ≤ 005, and hence,
by Proposition 6, coalition C cannot impose a (single)
winner. 
Proposition 8. Given the conditions of Proposition 3,
a coalition of individuals C ⊆ 811 0 0 0 1N 9 who have a pre-
ferred winner (possibly indifferent to other alternatives) in
common can impose this weak winner to the rest of the
group if and only if
∑
i∈C ki ≥ 005.
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 7.
Corollary of Proposition 8. Given the conditions
of Proposition 3, there is no coalition of Nc individuals
capable of imposing their preferred winner (possibly indif-
ferent to other alternatives) to the group if ki < 005/Nc
for i= 11 0 0 0 1N .
The proof is analogous to that of the corollary of
Proposition 7.
Proposition 9. Given the conditions of Proposition 3,
if there is no coalition of Nc individuals capable of impos-
ing their preferred (single) winner to the group, then any





i∈C¯ ki = 1, if
∑
i∈C ki ≤ 005,
then
∑
i∈C¯ ki ≥ 005, and the reasoning of Proposi-
tions 7 and 8 applies. 
This last result indicates that there will always be
at least one subset of individuals of a group that
might act strategically to impose a winner to the
whole group. In particular, if we guarantee that an
individual cannot act strategically to impose a win-
ner, then the remaining N − 1 individuals might act
strategically impose a winner to this individual; if two
individuals cannot impose a winner, then a group of
N − 2 individuals might do so, etc. If N/2 (the inte-
ger part of N/2) individuals cannot impose a winner,
then a group of N/2 + 1 individuals might do so.
In other words, a simple majority of the individuals
will always be able to impose a winner if this majority
acts strategically.
If it is requested that a coalition that is not a sim-
ple majority can never act strategically to impose
a (single) winner, then it is necessary to have ki ≤
005/4N/25 4i = 11 0 0 0 1N 5. This means a limit ki ≤ 005
if N = 2 or N = 3, ki ≤ 1/4 if N = 4 or N = 5, etc. As
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6. Concluding Notes
We introduced a concept of strategic dictator that is
consistent with the common understanding of that
term and derived new conditions for a group util-
ity function. Three types of dictatorial situations were
addressed: the possibility of imposing a complete
ranking of the alternatives, the possibility of impos-
ing a single winner to the group, and the possibil-
ity of imposing a weak winner (possibly tied with
other alternatives having the same maximal utility).
Avoiding these possibilities entails adding succes-
sively more stringent conditions to Keeney’s (1976)
conditions for a group utility function. Keeney’s con-
ditions, on the other hand, already prevented the pos-
sibility of imposing a weak ranking of the alternatives
by a dictator due to the monotonicity assumption B2.
The analysis was extended to consider the imposi-
tion of a winner by a coalition of individuals acting
strategically. We have shown that this is impossible
to avoid: if an individual is not a dictator, then the
coalition of the remaining individuals is dictatorial.
However, most people would not consider this to be a
problem. Moreover, in practice it is more difficult for
individuals to act strategically together (in collusion)
than it is for a single individual to act strategically on
his own. Therefore, it may not be warranted to con-
strain the group utility function to prevent the impo-
sition of a winner by a coalition of more than half
of the individuals. Nevertheless, in some situations,
preventing a dictatorial coalition of fewer individu-
als (e.g., 1/3 of the group), or at least preventing a
strategic dictator (by imposing IIW) will be consid-
ered a must-have feature for a group utility function.
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